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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."1 Four years ago, in Crawford v.
Washington,2 the United States Supreme Court held that this
right bars the admission of testimonial hearsay statements
against criminal defendants, regardless of whether or not the
statements fall within an evidentiary hearsay exception.3 It was
a decision that other courts later described as a "bombshell," a
"renaissance," and "a newly shaped lens" through which to view
the Confrontation Clause.4 The case generated an extensive
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Id. at 61.
4. See Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Crawford's Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation
of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation
Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (2008) (citing People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr.
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amount of discussion among legal commentators.5
Since its decision in Crawford, the Court has had to grapple
regularly with questions that Crawford left unanswered.6 This
term, the Court is poised to determine yet another unanswered
Crawford question in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts:7
"[w]hether a state forensic analyst's laboratory report prepared
for use in a criminal prosecution is 'testimonial' evidence subject
to the demands of the Confrontation Clause as set forth in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)."8
The outcome in Melendez-Diaz will have a significant impact
on America's criminal justice system in general. Moreover, the
case could raise important implications in capital sentencing
proceedings.
Parts I and II of this comment provide a brief overview of
Crawford and its progeny. Part III discusses the issue raised in
Melendez-Diaz and its potential impact. Part IV explains how
3d 846, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)) (calling Crawford a "bombshell"); State v.
Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 707 (N.M. 2004) (stating that after Crawford, the
courts view the Confrontation Clause through "a newly shaped lens"); State v.
Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 2005) (calling Crawford a "renaissance").
5. See, e.g., W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation
Clause After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1 (2005); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When
Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 105 (2005); John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment
Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967 (2005); Miguel A.
Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2004);
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005); Thomas J. Reed,
Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union:
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185
(2004); Ariana J. Torchin, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of
Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581 (2006);
Penny J. White, "He Said," "She Said," and Issues of Life and Death: The Right
to Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387
(2007).
6. See Giles v. California, _ U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); Danforth v.
Minnesota, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S.
406 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
7. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S.
argued Nov. 10, 2008) (No. 07-591).
8. Brief for Petitioner at i, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, __ U.S.
128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. filed June 16, 2008) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2468543.
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Melendez-Diaz could affect capital sentencing and uses the case
of State v. Owens9 as an example.
II. CRAWFORD'S RETURN TO THE "ORIGINAL INTENT"
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Lower Courts Held that Admission of Out-of-Court
Testimony from Crawford's Wife Did Not Violate the
Confrontation Clause
Kenneth Lee was stabbed in the torso at his apartment in
Thurston County, Washington.10 Michael Crawford admitted
that he and his wife, Sylvia, went to Lee's apartment because
they were upset about an earlier incident in which Lee had tried
to rape Sylvia."1 Crawford also admitted to stabbing Lee (and
suffering a cut to his own hand in the process) but claimed that
his actions were in self-defense, although his memory was shaky
about the details:
Q: Okay. Did you ever see anything in [Lee's] hands?
A: I think so, but I'm not positive.
Q: Okay, when you think so, what do you mean by that?
A: I could a swore I seen him goin' for somthin' before,
right before everything happened. He was like reachin',
fiddlin' around down here and stuff.., and I just ... I don't
know. I think, this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that
he pulled somethin' out and I grabbed for it and that's how I
got cut... but I'm not positive. I, I, my mind goes blank when
things like this happen. I mean, I just, I remember things
wrong, I remember things that just doesn't, don't make sense
to me later. 12
9. 664 S.E.2d 80 (2008). John H. Blume is currently counsel of record for
Freddie Owens in proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States.
10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 38-39.
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Under police questioning, Sylvia's story was substantially
similar to Crawford's, except for one significant difference:
Q: Did [Lee] do anything to fight back from this assault?
A: Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike
[Crawford's] hand down or something and then he put his
hands in his ... put his right hand in his right pocket. . . took
a step back . . . [Crawford] proceeded to stab him ... then his
hands were like ... how do you explain this ... open arms...
with his hands open and he fell down ... and we ran.
Q: Okay, when he's standing there with his open hands,
you're talking about [Lee], correct?
A: Yeah, after, after the fact, yes.
Q: Did you see anything in his hands at that point?
A: . . . um um, no.13
The State charged Crawford with assault and attempted
murder.14 Sylvia did not testify at Crawford's trial because of
Washington's marital privilege, which generally bars a spouse
from testifying against the other without consent. 15 Under state
law, however, the marital privilege does not extend to a spouse's
out-of-court statements. So, the State invoked the hearsay
exception for statements against penal interest and sought to
introduce Sylvia's statement as evidence that Crawford was not
acting in self-defense.16 Crawford objected on the grounds that,
notwithstanding state hearsay rules, the evidence would violate
his federal constitutional right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."17
13. Id. at 39.
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (West 1994).
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
209
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In its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts,18 the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not
bar admission of an out-of-court statement if the statement bears
"adequate 'indicia of reliability."'19 To meet that test, the
evidence must either: (a) fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception"; or, (b) bear "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."20 The trial court in Crawford admitted Sylvia's
statement on the latter ground, finding that the statement was
reliable because, among other things: (a) Sylvia was not shifting
blame to anyone else; (b) she was an eyewitness to the events; (c)
she was describing recent events; and, (d) "she was being
questioned by a 'neutral' law enforcement officer."21 The
Washington Supreme Court ultimately agreed with this outcome,
based on the separate ground that Sylvia's statement was
virtually identical to (i.e., "interlocked" with) Crawford's
statement and was, therefore, reliable.22
B. The Supreme Court Overruled Ohio v. Roberts, Dispensing
with over Twenty Years of Precedent as "Stray[ing] from the
Original Meaning of the Confrontation Clause"23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Crawford.24 The Court stated that the question presented could
not be resolved solely by reading the text of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.25 Instead, the Court turned
to "the historical background of the Clause to understand its
meaning."26 After an extensive review of old English and early
Colonial jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the "history
supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth
18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
19. Id. at 66 (internal citation omitted).
20. Id.
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id. at 42.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 43.
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW W~olume 3
HeinOnline -- 3 Charleston L. Rev. 210 2008-2009
Amendment."27 First, the Confrontation Clause was principally
directed at the "evil" of "ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."28 Second, "the Framers would not have
allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."29
Interpreting the Sixth Amendment with these two principles
in mind, the Court concluded that Roberts failed to remain
"faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause":30
Roberts conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence
on whether it falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." This test
departs from the historical principles [of the Confrontation
Clause] ... in two respects. First, it is too broad: It applies the
same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of
ex parte testimony. This often results in close constitutional
scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of
the Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too narrow:
It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon
a mere finding of reliability. This malleable standard often
fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations.31
Thus, the Court rejected Roberts and adopted a new test that
imposed an absolute bar on out-of-court testimonial statements,
absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine.32
The Court justified the new Crawford test on the basis that
the Framers did not intend to leave the Sixth Amendment's
protections to "the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of 'reliability"'-at least where testimonial
statements are involved.33 The Court pointed out that the lower
courts' application of Roberts had been unpredictable.34 In
27. Id. at 50.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 63. Elsewhere, the Court referred to the reliability
determination under the Roberts test as "amorphous, if not entirely subjective."
20091 Crime Labs and Prison Guards
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Crawford itself, the lower courts were divided on the reliability
determination: the trial court found that involvement by a
"neutral" law enforcement officer was a reliability factor, among
others, but the intermediate court reversed, citing government
involvement as one reason why Sylvia's statement was
unreliable.35 Admitting a testimonial statement on the basis that
police involvement makes it more reliable, the Court said, is like
"find[ing] reliability in the very factors that make the statements
testimonial."36
Finally, the Court concluded that the goal of the
Confrontation Clause is "a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination."37 Thus, whether or not a
particular piece of evidence falls within a state or federal hearsay
exception, or is otherwise reliable, is an irrelevant fact for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. "Dispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty."38 What matters is the defendant's opportunity-or lack
of opportunity-for cross-examination. "Where testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation."39
Ultimately, the Court declined to provide a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial," saying only that "[w]hatever else the
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and
to police interrogations."40 But the Court did allude to several
possibilities. The Court noted that "testimony" is typically
defined as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
Id.
35. Id. at 66-67.
36. Id. at 65.
37. Id. at 61.
38. Id. at 62.
39. Id. at 68-69.
40. Id. at 68.
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 3
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purpose of establishing or proving some fact."41 The Court
described various "formulations" of a "core class of 'testimonial'
statements" as including "ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,
[and] extrajudicial statements contained in formalized
testimonial materials."42
III. THE COURT CONTINUES TO DEAL WITH CRAWFORD'S
APPLICATION
A. The Court Provided a Definition for "Testimonial" in the
Context of Police Interrogation
After Crawford's revamping of the standards applied under
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, petitioners began
to consistently ask the Court to accept cases addressing further
Crawford implications. Two years after Crawford, the Court
refined the definition of "testimonial." In Davis v. Washington,43
the Court consolidated two cases on writs of certiorari to the
Supreme Courts of Washington and Indiana in State v. Davis44
and Hammon v. State,45 respectively.
In the specific context of police interrogations, the Court held
that statements are non-testimonial where "circumstances
objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency."46 On the other hand, statements made in the course
of police interrogation are testimonial "when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
43. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
44. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
45. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
46. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
20091 Crime Labs and Prison Guards
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prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."47
In Davis, the Court also confirmed that Crawford applies
only to testimonial hearsay, observing that Crawford had already
suggested as much. The Court noted that the text of the
Confrontation Clause "applies to 'witnesses' against the
accused-in other words, those who 'bear testimony,"' and that
"[ain accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not."48
B. Since Its Decision in Davis, the Court Has Dealt with
Crawford Issues at Least Once Each Term
After deciding Davis in 2006, the Court has addressed
Crawford issues in a variety of cases. In 2007, the Court decided
Whorton v. Bockting,49 which held that the rule set out in
Crawford is not retroactive and does not apply to cases already
final on direct review.50 In 2008, the Court determined a similar
issue in Danforth v. Minnesota,51 which confirmed that Crawford
announced a "new rule," but further held that the states are free
to apply Crawford more broadly if they choose to do so. 52
Most recently, in Giles v. California,53 the Court addressed
the scope of the right to confrontation where there is an
allegation of forfeiture by wrongdoing.54 Common-law courts
historically allowed the introduction of statements by an absent
witness, even where the defendant had no prior opportunity for
cross-examination, if the witness was "detained" or "kept away"
by the defendant's "means or procurement."55 In Giles, the lower
47. Id.
48. Id. at 823-24 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004))
(internal quotations omitted).
49. 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
50. Id.
51. __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
52. Id. at 1035.
53. __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
54. Id. at 2681.
55. Id. at 2682-84.
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courts held that this "exception" allowed a murder victim's
testimonial hearsay statements to be admitted against the
defendant charged with the victim's murder because the murder
itself was a wrongful act that caused the victim to be unavailable
at trial.56
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that forfeiture by
wrongdoing applies only when the defendant engages in conduct
designed to prevent the witness from testifying-not when the
mere murder itself makes the witness unavailable.57 Otherwise,
the right to confrontation would depend on nothing more than
the trial judge's pre-trial assessment of the defendant's guilt-an
outcome "repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by
jury."58
This Term, the Court faces another open Crawford question
in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.59 The Court heard oral
arguments on November 10, 2008.60
IV. MELENDEZ-DIAZ COULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE
TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TYPES OF FORENSIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Background of the Case
Prior to the Roberts era, "[the United States Supreme Court]
and others "generally assumed that the Sixth Amendment
required the prosecution, absent a stipulation from a defendant,
56. Id. at 2682.
57. Id. at 2691.
58. Id.
59. __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). The Court declined to hear a
separate case from Iowa raising a similar Confrontation Clause question. Iowa
v. Bently, asked the Court to decide whether a report of an interview with a
child about a sex crime may be used as evidence if the child does not testify at
trial. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Iowa v. Bentley, __ U.S. _, 128 S. Ct.
1655 (U.S. filed Dec. 26, 2007) (No. 07-886), 2007 WL 4661025. The decision
left in place an Iowa Supreme Court ruling that such reports are barred under
the Confrontation Clause. State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 302-03 (Iowa
2007).
60. U.S. Supreme Court Docket Report, available at http://origin.
www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-591.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
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to present the findings of forensic examiners through live
testimony at trial."61 But after Roberts, courts began admitting
crime laboratory reports instead of live testimony by labeling the
reports as business or public records.62 Many state legislatures
enacted laws specifically making crime lab reports admissible at
trial in lieu of live testimony.63 Massachusetts enacted a statute
directing courts to admit sworn crime-laboratory reports as
"prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and ... the net
weight of the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or
chemical analyzed . *..."64 Prosecutors are not required to call
the forensic analyst who performed a chemical analysis covered
by Massachusetts' statute, even if defendants request that they
do so. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has approved the
statute, saying its purpose "is to reduce court delays and the
inconvenience of having the analyst called as a witness in each
case ."65
Melendez-Diaz was arrested and charged with trafficking
cocaine.66 The primary evidence against him at trial was a set of
crime-lab reports, stating that four plastic bags taken from one of
his co-defendants and nineteen plastic bags taken from the back
of the police car in which they were riding after they were
arrested on suspicion of drug charges, contained "a substance
containing cocaine."67 The reports do not describe the
qualifications or experience of the analyst who conducted the
testing; they do not indicate whether any measures were taken to
preserve the integrity of the items tested; they do not identify the
testing methods used; they do not specify the percentage of
cocaine allegedly present in the substances tested; and, they do
61. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 3 (citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912);
State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tenn. 1977)).
62. Id.
63. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV.
478 (2006).
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2004); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 22C, § 39 (Law Co-op. 1996) (providing the same when the police
department performs the chemical analysis itself).
65. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 703 n.1 (Mass. 2005).
66. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 7.
67. Id.
[Volume 3
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not address why some of the samples differed in color and
consistency from the others.68
At trial, the crime-lab reports were admitted into evidence
over Melendez-Diaz's objection on Crawford grounds.69 The jury
found Melendez-Diaz guilty and sentenced him to three years in
prison and three years probation.70 The Appeals Court of
Massachusetts affirmed, relying on Commonwealth v. Verde,71 in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that introducing a
crime-lab report in lieu of live testimony "does not deny a
defendant the right to confrontation" because such a report is
"akin to a business or official record, which the Court [in
Crawford] stated was not testimonial in nature."72 The Verde
court further noted that drug analyses are "neither discretionary
nor based on opinion," but rather are a product of "well-
recognized scientific tests."73 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
denied review in Melendez-Diaz without comment.
B. Petitioner Argues that Lab Reports Are Testimonial
Evidence Subject to the Confrontation Clause
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Melendez-Diaz.74 Melendez-Diaz asserts that crime-lab reports
are created for the enforcement of law and, therefore, are the
modern equivalent of ex parte affidavits-exactly the kind of
"solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact" that the Court described as
testimonial in Crawford.75 Therefore, labeling forensic lab
reports as business or public records is immaterial for purposes
of the Confrontation Clause.76
Melendez-Diaz acknowledges that the Court referred to
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 8-9.
71. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 701 (Mass. 2005).
72. Id. at 706.
73. Id. at 705.
74. __ U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
75. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11.
76. Id.
2009]
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common-law "shop-book" records rule as "non-testimonial" in
Crawford, but argues that the reference was specifically about
classic business records, which are not expressly prepared for law
enforcement purposes to aid in criminal investigations. Forensic
lab reports, however, are "fundamentally testimonial in a way
that classic business and official records [are] not."77
Finally, Melendez-Diaz challenges the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's reliance on forensic reports as "objective"
evidence, noting that "[s]uch reports reflect complicated,
subjective interpretations of imprecise scientific tests."78
C. Massachusetts Argues that Lab Reports Are Non-
Testimonial Business Records to Which No Right of
Confrontation Attaches
The State of Massachusetts argues that forensic lab reports
are not testimonial because they are not accusatory-they "do not
accuse anyone of anything criminal; instead, they merely
establish the current physical composition and weight of a
chemical substance."79 According to the State, these "neutral"
and "objective" facts only become inculpatory when a testifying
witness "provides the necessary evidentiary links to connect the
substance tested in the laboratory to the accused's past criminal
conduct."80
Moreover, the State argues that forensic lab reports are not
equivalent to ex parte affidavits because "the hearsay statement
is not the product of any official examination."1 Rather, they are
simply non-testimonial business records.
Finally, the State asserts that even if a right to confrontation
attaches to the records at issue in this case, Melendez-Diaz had
an opportunity to examine the analyst, but chose not to do so,
and any error that occurred should be subject to a harmless error
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id.
79. Brief for Respondent at 10, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, - U.S.
__, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. filed Aug. 29, 2008) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4454224.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 11.
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D. Melendez-Diaz Could Have Broad-Ranging Effects on the
Criminal Justice System
1. The Case Should Resolve Conflicting Authority on the
Precise Issue of Drug Lab Reports and Provide Further
Guidance on the Meaning of Testimonial Statements
One commentator has called Melendez-Diaz "[t]he most
important case for the future of our criminal justice system."83
The case is certainly important for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is the vast amount of conflicting authority on this
issue. While seeking certiorari review, Melendez-Diaz noted a
"six-to-five" split among federal appeals courts.8 4  Forty-four
states and the District of Columbia currently permit courts to
admit forensic analysts' reports to establish that seized
substances are illegal drugs, even when the analysts themselves
are not called to testify.85 Both parties in Melendez-Diaz have
referenced a particularly conflicted case from the Seventh
Circuit. In United States v. Moon,86 the court held that the
interpretation of forensic data is testimonial, but that an expert
witness may nonetheless testify in court about those data
without an opportunity for cross-examination of the analyst who
prepared the reports-i.e., "the Confrontation Clause does not
forbid the use of raw data produced by scientific instruments,
though the interpretation of those data may be testimonial."87 It
is no surprise that the lower courts are confused about
Crawford's application. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged
82. Id. at 12.
83. Matthew G. Kaiser, Lab Technicians, Too, THE NAT'L L.J. (July 14,
2008) available at http://www.law.com/j sp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202422896765 (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
- U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. filed Oct. 26, 2007) (No. 07-591), 2007 WL
3252033, at 9.
85. Id. at 15.
86. 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 362.
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in Crawford that "our refusal to articulate a comprehensive
definition [of 'testimonial'] in this case will cause interim
uncertainty."88 At a minimum, Melendez-Diaz presents an
opportunity for the Court to resolve widespread uncertainty and
provide further guidance on the meaning of "testimonial."
2. Further, the Case Could Affect How Courts Handle All Types
of Forensic Evidence
But Melendez-Diaz could create much broader results than
simple, fact-specific guidance as to the definition of "testimonial."
Massachusetts has complained that the outcome urged by
Melendez-Diaz "would render testimonial-and, thus, subject to
the Confrontation Clause-all laboratory reports prepared for
use at trial."89 The result would be to "impose enormous burdens
in countless criminal cases by needlessly requiring live testimony
from laboratory technicians who are unlikely to have any
independent recollection of one-out of the thousands-of tests
they routinely perform."90
The State's latter assertion is doubtful, at least in every case;
many forensic technicians are able to recall and testify about
their forensic testing procedures and results. Even if this
assertion were true, it is hard to see how the result would be an
"enormous burden." If a lab technician truly does not recall
anything about the analysis, it would not take long to say so.
However, the State is undoubtedly correct that Melendez-Diaz
could dramatically change the way that forensic evidence is
admitted in criminal trials. The prospect of such a dramatic
shift, however, strikes us as a less-than-compelling reason to
deny relief in this case. Even aside from the Court's recent
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it seems obvious that crime
lab reports should not be introduced against a criminal defendant
without an opportunity to cross-examine the person who
prepared the report. And, given the new Crawford era, it is hard
88. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004).
89. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 2, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. filed Feb. 5, 2008) (No. 07-
591), 2008 WL 377677.
90. Id.
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to imagine how Melendez-Diaz could end up without at least
some form of relief. The nature of that relief could impact how
courts handle all types of forensic evidence.
Melendez-Diaz and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
seem to agree that forensic evidence is currently an integral part
of many criminal prosecutions.91 DNA, in particular, is likely to
become more frequently used in criminal cases. "The federal
government, and many state governments, already collect DNA
from anyone convicted of a felony."92 "[S]everal states [currently]
name DNA samples in charging documents to try to preserve the
statute of limitations until the owner of the DNA can be
located."93 The President's DNA Initiative, a federally funded
program, encourages governmental authorities to use "cold hit"
DNA technology to help solve cases without a suspect.94 And yet,
a vast body of research95 and news reports96 belies the claim that
91. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 84, at 9; Respondent's
Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 89, at 2-3.
92. Kaiser, supra note 83.
93. Id.
94. See President's DNA Initiative: Advancing Justice Through DNA
Technology, available at http://www.dna.gov/audiences/officerscourt/
policy-prosecutor/suspectless/coldhits (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). A "cold hit"
occurs when DNA taken from a crime scene "matches" with DNA samples
stored in a computer database. See id.
95. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55 (2008); Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
859 (1996); Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A
Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279
(2005); William C. Thompson, Franco Taroni & Colin G.G. Aitken, How the
Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA Evidence, J. OF
FORENSIC SCI. 48, no. 1 (2003); William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the "Gold
Standard" Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, THE
CHAMPION, Feb. 30, 2006, at 10.
96. See, e.g., Maryann Spoto, Murder, Rape Charges Dropped Due to
Botched DNA Evidence, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 7, 2006, at 28
(reporting that cold hit case must be dropped because the analyst who made the
match had examined evidence from the old case, along with a new case
involving the defendant, on the same day, raising the possibility of cross-
contamination); Jeff Coen & Carlos Sadovi, Crime Lab Botched DNA Tests,
State Says, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2005, at C1 (noting that Illinois state police
found numerous errors in results reported from Bode Technology, an
independent lab based in Virginia); Annie Sweeney & Frank Main, Botched
DNA Report Falsely Implicates Woman; Case Compels State to Change how It
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DNA test results are infallible, objective conclusions of fact. For
example, Earl Washington, Jr. was convicted and sentenced to
death for the 1982 rape and murder of Rebecca Lynn Williams in
Culpepper, Virginia.97 Mr. Washington spent seventeen years in
prison, and came within hours of execution, before Virginia's
governor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment, ultimately
followed by a full pardon for the crime.98 Post-conviction DNA
testing contradicted results on the same samples performed
earlier by the State Division of Forensic Sciences.99 An outside
Reports Lab Findings, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2004, at 18 (noting that a
laboratory forensic profile "matched" woman, based on what ultimately turned
out to be only a partial match, was revealed erroneous when woman, after
arrest on warrant, was shown to be incarcerated at time of offense); Keith
Matheny, Supervisor Accused of Passing Off DNA Test, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD-
EAGLE, Dec. 19, 2004 (detailing internal investigation of supervisor in Michigan
State Police Crime Lab DNA unit that had a subordinate take a proficiency test
for him); DNA Testing Mistakes at the State Patrol Crime Labs, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 2004 (cataloguing a series of errors ranging from cross-
contaminations samples across and within cases, including a vaginal sample
with semen of positive control, along with other errors); Rick Orlov, Lab Used
by LAPD Falsified DNA Data, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 2004, at N1
(describing dismissal of Sarah Blair from Orchid Cellmark, a private DNA lab,
after allegations that she manipulated DNA data); Paula McMahon, Crime Lab
Botches Murder Inquiry: Prosecutors Must Drop Charges After DNA Evidence Is
Contaminated, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 24, 2003, at 1A
(announcing dropping of murder and robbery charges due to "someone
squeezing the eye-dropper into the wrong vial" and noting disagreement
regarding whether government or defense attorney caught error); Vic Ryckaert,
Judge Asked to Halt DNA Retests: Crime Lab Less Than Candid About Cases
Under Review, Attorney Says, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 13, 2003, at 1B
(describing fall-out from publication of prosecutor's request that crime lab retest
DNA evidence in sixty-four cases believed compromised by analyst); Keith Paul,
Audit Calls for Changes in Police DNA Lab, LAS VEGAS SUN, May, 23, 2002, at 1
(reporting results of audit conducted after independently hired defense expert
caught forensic lab in mistakenly labeling DNA typing results with name of
innocent man); Glenn Puit, Police Forensics: DNA Mix-up Prompts Audit at
Lab, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at 1B (discussing audit at Las Vegas
laboratory after switched names on DNA profiles led to nearly a year-long
imprisonment of "suspect").
97. Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Earl Washington, available at
http://innocenceproject.org/Content/282.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Confusion Over DNA a Threat to Justice, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Aug. 29, 2005; Frank Green, Study Will Assess Whether Errors in Washington
Case Are "Endemic to the System", RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 14, 2005;
Alarming Indifference from Crime Lab Boss, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 10, 2005.
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investigation concluded that the state lab botched the DNA
analysis in the case by failing to follow proper procedures and
misinterpreting the test results.100 Virginia's governor ordered a
broader investigation of the lab, which unveiled problematic
testing procedures and misleading testimony in two additional
capital cases handled by the same lab.101 Mr. Washington was
released from prison on February 12, 2001.102
Extensive research demonstrates that all forensic testing,
and not just DNA analysis, involves human execution and
judgment, and therefore has a potential for significant error.10 3
The National Innocence Network, in its amicus curiae brief in
support of Melendez-Diaz, writes that more than 200
exonerations have occurred in the past decade. Of these 200-plus
exonerations, "more than half involved forensic errors in the
original trial-errors that ranged from simple mistakes to
exaggeration and overreaching, to the reliance on faulty pseudo-
science, to outright fabrication."104 These and other reported
errors have prompted a number of systemic reviews, which have
established that problems with forensic practices in state and




102. Innocence Project, supra note 97.
103. See, e.g., Brief of National Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachussetts, __ U.S. -, 128 S. Ct.
1647 (U.S. filed June 23, 2008) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2550614 (generally
describing a widespread pattern of forensic errors).
104. Id. at 8.
105. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Glynn, - F. Supp. 2d -, 2008 WL
4293317 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that ballistics evidence is not a "science" and
therefore ballistics examiners could be permitted only to testify that a firearms
match was "more likely than not," and citing similar federal cases); Joel Rubin
& Richard Winton, LAPD Blames Faulty Fingerprint Analysis for Erroneous
Accusations, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008 available at http://www.latimes.com/
news/local/la-me-fingerprints 17-008oct,0,6045556.story; John Jay College to
Launch Arson Screening Project with $250,000 Grant from JEHT Foundation
(July 1, 2008), available at http://www.jjay.cuny.edu]1520.php (last visited Oct.
21, 2008) (describing the development of an Arson Screening Project designed to
screen cases involving claims of wrongful conviction based on the use of faulty,
"folk-science" fire indicators); Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About
Forensic Science, THE NEW YORKER, May 7, 2007 available at
2009]
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From this array of research, comments, news reports and
individual examples, it is evident that forensic "science" is often
not particularly "scientific" at all, and thus, in addition to the
other evidentiary restrictions to ensure its reliability, all forensic
evidence should be subject to the crucible of cross-examination.
The Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz could and should reaffirm
a commitment to vigorous adversarial testing by cross-
examination of all forensic evidence.
V. MELENDEZ-DIAZ AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON
CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
In addition to the issues described above, Melendez-Diaz
could have an important impact on the penalty phase of capital
trials. All death-penalty cases proceed in two parts: a guilt-or-
innocence proceeding and, if the defendant is found guilty, a
sentencing proceeding (sometimes also called the "penalty
phase"). The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that a
capital sentencing proceeding is akin to a separate trial. In
Bullington v. Missouri,106 the Court stated that the penalty phase
"in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial
on the issue of guilt or innocence."107 Similarly, in Ring v.
Arizona,O8 the Court held that a capital defendant cannot be
denied the right to a jury in the penalty phase, because the fact-
finders' determination of aggravating factors, which make the
defendant eligible for death as a penalty, "operate as 'the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense."'109
The Court has observed that "[b]ecause of [the qualitative
difference in the penalty of death], there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."11o It
follows that capital defendants should be afforded at least the
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2OO7/O5/O7/O7/O5/O7fafacttoobin
(exposing fiber and hair analyses as unreliable).
106. 451 U.S. 430 (1967).
107. Id. at 438.
108. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
109. Id. at 609 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
110. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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same constitutional safeguards at a sentencing proceeding as the
average criminal defendant enjoys in general. These protections
naturally should include the right to confrontation, the ultimate
goal of which is "to ensure reliability of evidence."11
Pre-Crawford Supreme Court precedent suggests that the
right to confrontation does apply to capital sentencing
proceedings. In Gardner v. Florida,112 the Court held that a
capital defendant "was denied due process of law when the death
sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain."13
Similarly, the Court has relied on Gardner to reverse death
sentences on Due Process grounds where the defendant was
denied the opportunity to rebut the state's case for death.114
Several lower courts have afforded confrontation rights in
capital sentencing proceedings, either expressly,115 or by
assuming that such rights apply without noting any
controversy. 116  And yet, still several other courts have
disagreed.117 Indeed, courts and counsel often treat capital
sentencing proceedings as somehow warranting fewer
constitutional and evidentiary protections in general.118 The case
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
112. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
113. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
114. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1994); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
115. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1251-55 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2006); People v. Floyd,
464 P.2d 64, 80 (Cal. 1970); Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1985);
Grandison v. State, 670 A.2d 398, 413 (Md. 1995).
116. People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 332 (Cal. 1991); State v. Ross, 849
A.2d 648, 697-98 (Conn. 2004); Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1105 (Ind.
1992); State v. Nobles, 584 S.E.2d 765, 768-69 (N.C. 2003); State v. Moen, 786
P.2d 111, 136 (Or. 1990); Commonwealth v. Green, 581 A.2d 544, 564 (Pa.
1990); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 880-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2006); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392
(7th Cir. 2002); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 2001); Del Vecchio v.
Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1994); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d
932 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Iowa
2005); United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889 (E.D. Va. 2005); Summers
v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (Nev. 2006).
118. There are a number of other looming issues in the penalty phase of
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of State v. Owens 119 serves as a good example.
A. In State v. Owens, the Lower Court Admitted Prison Incident
Reports as Business Records
Freddie Eugene Owens "was convicted of murder, armed
robbery, using a firearm [during] the commission of a violent
crime, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery."120 He received
a death sentence for murder.121 On his first appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Owens's convictions, but
reversed his death sentence. 22 Following a bench re-sentencing
proceeding, Owens again received a death sentence, and again
the South Carolina Supreme Court vacated the sentence, finding
that the trial judge's comments to Owens with regard to his right
to a jury trial constituted reversible error.123
Owens's second resentencing proceeding was tried to a
jury.124 During the proceeding, the State sought to introduce
evidence that Owens had an extensive record of prison
disciplinary incidents.125 Instead of calling live witnesses, the
State wanted to introduce a series of prison incident reports that
detailed sixty-four separate disciplinary infractions allegedly
committed by Owens.126 Some of these infractions were reported
by prison guards, while others were reported by Owens's fellow
inmates.127 Owens was not subject to prosecution or formal
proceedings related to the reported infractions. Rather, the
reports were simply ex parte accounts of alleged bad acts.128
Owens objected to the admission of the reports on the ground
capital trials, including the admission of hearsay in victim impact evidence and
evidence of unadjudicated prior bad acts.
119. 664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008).
120. State v. Owens, 552 S.E.2d 745, 749 (S.C. 2001).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 760-61.
123. State v. Owens, 607 S.E.2d 78 (S.C. 2004).
124. State v. Owens, 664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008).
125. Id. at 81.
126. Id. at 81-82.
127. Record on Appeal at 1362-65 (on file with authors).
128. Id. at 1382.
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that they were not reliable.129 Ultimately, the trial judge allowed
the State to admit a summary showing only those incidents
reported by prison guards.130 This reduced the number of
incidents to twenty-eight, which included allegations such as:
"spat on a correctional officer," "stab[bed] an inmate in the
shower," "threaten[ed] an officer," and "[threw] hot water on
another inmate."131 The jury sentenced Owens to death.
On appeal, Owens argued that admission of the prison
incident summary violated his right to confrontation and the
prohibition against hearsay.132 The South Carolina Supreme
Court found that the Confrontation Clause claim was not
preserved for review,133 but held that the summary was
admissible as a business record.134 The court communicated its
thoughts on the Confrontation Clause issue, however, by citing
Crawford as standing for the proposition that "properly
administered, [business records] exceptions are among the safest
against a confrontation-clause challenges [sic]."135 This
pronouncement closely mirrors the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's claim that forensic lab reports are "akin to a business or
official record, which the Court [in Crawford] stated was not
testimonial in nature."136
129. Id. at 1355-57.
130. State v. Owens, 664 S.E.2d 80, 81 (S.C. 2008).
131. Id. at 81-82.
132. Id. at 81.
133. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the Confrontation
Clause argument was procedurally defaulted because defense counsel did not
raise the issue to the trial court. Id. Trial counsel did, however, challenge
admission of the records on the basis that they were not reliable. Record on
Appeal, supra note 127, at 1406. The trial court noted that the issue was "an
important matter from a Constitutional standpoint," id. at 1434, and described
the records as "absolutely hearsay, not subject to cross-examination." Id. at
1414.
134. Owens, 664 S.E.2d at 81.
135. Id.
136. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass. 2005).
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B. Melendez-Diaz Could Confirm that Prison Incident Reports
Are Testimonial and Thus Inadmissible Under Crawford
There are a number of parallels between the crime lab
reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and prison incident reports,
such as those introduced in Owens. Because of these parallels,
Melendez-Diaz could be instructive on how the Court would deal
with similar types of evidence like prison incident reports.
Both prison incident reports and crime lab reports seem
calculated to "establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution."137 In fact, prison incident reports
fall more squarely into this category than crime lab reports. The
State of Massachusetts has argued that reports of forensic
analyses do not establish or prove past "events," but merely
recount "objective facts." Although we find this distinction
tenuous at best, the same argument cannot be applied to prison
incident reports. The reports in Owens-i.e., "spat on
correctional officer"-cannot be described as anything other than
an attempt to establish or prove past events.
Further, prison incident reports, like crime lab reports, are
"potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution" and "would be
available for use at a later trial."138 Although not all incidents
recorded in such reports ultimately lead to prosecution, it is
difficult to conceive that a prison official would write an incident
report describing improper or illegal activity without the
possibility of prosecution in mind, either in prison disciplinary
proceedings or in traditional criminal charges. Prison officials
write such reports not only with the possibility of prosecution in
mind, but also to protect themselves from civil liability. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
That prison guards may be held accountable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for physical beatings of prisoners, deprivation of
medical care, or deprivation of hygienic conditions, has been
established for enough years that it can safely be assumed at
least some guards write their reports on such occurrences with
137. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
138. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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that possibility in mind.139
Since Crawford, a small number of courts have faced this
issue and excluded prison incident reports from capital
sentencing proceedings. In Russeau v. State,140 the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas held that prison reports detailing
disciplinary offenses "amounted to unsworn, ex parte affidavits of
government employees and were the very type of evidence the
[Confrontation] Clause was intended to prohibit."141 In United
States v. Mills,142 a federal district court barred the admission of
prison discipline reports that described alleged assaults and
attempts to smuggle contraband.143 Although the defendant was
not prosecuted for each of these violations, the court nonetheless
held that the reports were barred under Crawford, because the
statements contained therein were "made 'under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
[they] would be available for use at a later trial."'144
Despite the parallels between the records at issue in
Melendez-Diaz and those at issue in Owens, there are several
important differences. For example, the State argues that
forensic lab reports are not testimonial, because they do not
"accuse" anyone of wrongdoing.145 The same cannot be said of
prison incident reports. The State claims that crime lab reports
are not testimonial, because there is no official government
involvement in the testing itself.146 By contrast, prison guards,
who reported all of the incidents ultimately introduced before the
jury in Owens, are government officials empowered to enforce
laws and rules in the prison system. Similarly, the State argues
that forensic reports are not ex parte affidavits, because they are
"not the product of any official examination"-an argument that
139. Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 1972) (internal
citations omitted).
140. 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
141. Id. at 881.
142. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
143. Id. at 1137-38.
144. Id. at 1137 (quoting Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir.
2004)).
145. Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 10.
146. Id. at 11.
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is specious in any case, nonetheless does not apply in Owens.
Thus, even if the Court decides against Melendez-Diaz, the
Court's reasoning could shed light on similar Confrontation
Clause issues in other cases. We will wait until the Court
renders a decision before we brand it another "bombshell" or
"renaissance," but we will certainly watch with interest for the
Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz.
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